Published in the American Journal of Bioethics.

Après le 11 septembre 2001, un ressort essentiel des politiques américaines de renforcement de la « sécurité nationale » a pris la forme d’une insistance quasi paranoïaque sur les menaces potentiellement catastrophiques constituées par le cyber-terrorisme. Un grand nombre de commentateurs politiques, militaires ou économiques, ainsi que d’universitaires et de journalistes, ont envahi..

Current art world statistics demonstrate that the fight for gender and race equality in the art world is far from over: only sixteen percent of this year's Venice Biennale artists were female; only fourteen percent of the work displayed at MoMA in 2016 was by nonwhite artists; only a third of artists represented by U.S. galleries are female, but over two-thirds of students enrolled in art and art-history programs are young women. Arranged in thematic sections focusing on feminism, race, and (...) sexuality, Curatorial Activism examines and illustrates pioneering examples of exhibitions that have broken down boundaries and demonstrated that new approaches are possible, from Linda Nochlin's 'Women Artists' at LACMA in the mid-1970s to Jean-Hubert Martin's 'Carambolages' in 2016 at the Grand Palais in Paris. Including interviews with pioneering curators such as Okwui Enwezor, Linda Nochlin, Jean-Hubert Martin, and Nan Goldin, this volume is both an invaluable source of practical information for those who understand that institutions must be a driving force in this area and a vital source of inspiration for today's expanding new generation of curators. Preface by Lucy R. Lippard. (shrink)

Bortolotti argues that the irrationality of many delusions is no different in kind from the irrationality that marks many non-pathological states typically treated as beliefs. She takes this to secure the doxastic status of those delusions. Bortolotti’s approach has many benefits. For example, it accounts for the fact that we can often make some sense of what deluded subjects are up to, and helps explain why some deluded subjects are helped by cognitive behavioral therapy. But there is an alternative approach (...) that secures the same benefits as Bortolotti’s account while bringing additional benefits. The alternative approach treats both many delusions and many of the non-pathological states to which Bortolotti compares them as in-between states. Subjects in in-between states don’t fully believe the beliefs which it is sometimes convenient to ascribe to them. This alternative approach to belief and belief-ascription fits well with an independently attractive account of the varied purposes of our ordinary attitude ascriptions. It also makes it easier to make fine-grained distinctions between intentional attitudes of different kinds. (shrink)

Conversations with patients and families about the allow-natural-death (AND) order, along with the standard do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order during end-of-life (EOL) decision-making, may create engagement and understanding while promoting care that can be defended using enduring notions of autonomy, beneficence, and professional duty. Ethical, legal, and pragmatic issues surrounding EOL care decision-making seem to suggest discussion of AND orders as one strategy clinicians could consider at the individual practice level and at institutional levels. A discussion of AND orders, along with traditional (...) DNR orders is presented. This is followed by argument and counter-argument focused on ethical, legal, and practical issues germane to EOL care decision-making associated with use of AND orders. (shrink)

In this chapter I argue that Alexis de Tocqueville describes the virtue of citizenship in a way that is relevant to contemporary virtue ethics. He explains how a group can possess a virtue that is distinct from the virtue of individual members of the group. (this is an unofficial draft).

In this paper, I aim to demonstrate that the consequences of the current United States health insurance scheme on both physician and patient autonomy is dire. So dire, in fact, that the only moral solution is something other than what we have now. The United States healthcare system faces much criticism at present. But my focus is particular: I am interested in the ways in which insurance interferes with physician and patient autonomy. I will argue in favor of an expansion (...) of the traditional conception of what I call “medical autonomy” or “healthcare autonomy” and the usual role it plays in bioethical discussions. More generally, I show that in morally designing or evaluating any healthcare system, serious attention should be paid to how this system helps foster what I call active autonomy. (shrink)

There are few, if any, other educational philosophers that have left their mark internationally as John Dewey has. Author of 40 books and no less than 700 articles that appeared in over 140 journals, Dewey's work has been translated into at least 35 languages. His landmark Democracy and Education - published over a century ago in 1916 - is one of the most cited educational texts ever. Dewey has inspired educators and provoked controversies in his day, and still does so (...) today. This volume sets out to engage with Dewey's educational thought, especially as it relates to its circulation in the countries bordering on the Mediterranean. Authors consider his enduring influence, and reflect on the 'push' and 'pull' forces that served to anchor progressivism, in its multiple manifestations, in the region. The notion of a unidirectional force - personified by Dewey - that is somehow absorbed by the 'receiving' country is problematised by most if not all chapters in this volume. Rather, contributors carefully show how context affects a process marked by active appropriation, re-interpretation, adaptation, as well as resistance. (shrink)

Early in the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, concern that there could be a shortage of ventilators raised the possibility of rationing care. Denying patients life-saving care captures our moral imagination, prompting the demand for a defensible framework of ethical principles for determining who will live and who will die. Behind the moral dilemma posed by the shortage of a particular medical good lies a broad moral geography encompassing important and often unarticulated societal values, as well as assumptions about (...) the nature and purpose of health care and the consequences of long-standing choices about health care as a social good. This article explores what COVID-19 has exposed concerning values and choices around health care in the United States. Employing the lens of Catholic Social Thought, it argues for an approach to rationing that is grounded in respect for human dignity, committed to distributing social goods in light of the common good, and self-conscious about the construction of vulnerability to illness and death. (shrink)

The imperviousness of delusions to counter-evidence makes it tempting to classify them as imaginings. Bayne and Pacherie argue that adopting a dispositional account of belief can secure the doxastic status of delusions. But dispositionalism can only secure genuinely doxastic status for mental states by giving folk-psychological norms a significant role in the individuation of attitudes. When such norms individuate belief, deluded subjects will not count as believing their delusions. In general, dispositionalism won't confer genuinely doxastic status more often than do (...) competing accounts of belief. (shrink)

The introduction describes the monographic section of Scienza & Politica dedicated to the innovations which postcolonial and feminist studies in Latin America are introducing in the history of political thought as a whole. The fundamental concepts of the following essays are presented here to introduce their historic and critic analysis. It is also highlighted the specific character of continental laboratory which the historic and political reflection is assuming in South American continent and the connections which are occurring with other countries (...) in the global South. (shrink)

The dispute on mongrelization starts to play a fundamental role in Latin America inside the modernist debates about the national unity between the end of the XIX century and the beginning of the XX century, to later acquire an unprecedented global diffusion in the eighties and the nineties of the last century. Using the writings of the Bolivian sociologist Silvia River Cusicanqui and of the Argentinian anthropologist, who has long since been active in Brazil, Rita Segato, the essay reconstructs the (...) historic and political happening of metissage in Latin America. The authors show that it is an historical concept which worked as an instance of legitimation both in the period of colonial oppression and later in the epoch of republican modernization. It represents the instrument to hide – if not to delete – the original character of modern State; for this reason it has been able to play a fundamental role in the epoch of liberalism as much as in the neoliberal one. However in mongrelization what is also at stake is that it can express the radically de-colonizing impulse of the differences as forms of litigation which inhabit the complex contemporary Latin American territories. (shrink)

In 2010, a South Carolina mother was taken to court when her fourteen‐year‐old son reached 555 pounds. An article on the story reported, “His mother, Jerri Gray, lost custody of her son and is being charged with criminal neglect. Gray is facing 15 years on two felony counts, the first U.S. felony case involving childhood obesity.” If the caretakers of obese children are negligent, then they are also morally and legally blameworthy. I want to suggest, however, that important ethical differences (...) exist between negligent or abusive caretakers and the caretakers of obese children and that these differences ought to make a moral and legal difference. The distinctions are nuanced, and the ethical pictures in cases of abuse, neglect, and obesity are far from black and white. However, the various types of harm that children face from their caretakers should be placed in neither the same ethical nor the same legal category.When children are beaten or sexually molested, the justification for taking them out of the home is clear: the caretakers are violating the rights of their children. Similarly, with neglect, caretakers are failing to provide their children the necessities to which they are entitled. The central question that I want to address in this article is whether the actions (or inaction) of caretakers that allow a child to become obese are morally or practically analogous to physical abuse or neglect. Ultimately, I will argue that parenting that allows a child to become obese is so morally different from both abuse and neglect that it is best understood as falling outside these categories altogether. This conclusion has important moral, practical, and legal implications. (shrink)

Our behavior doesn't always match the beliefs attributed to us, and sometimes the mismatch raises questions about what our beliefs actually are. I compare two approaches to such cases, and argue in favor of the one which allows some belief-attributions to lack a determinate truth-value. That approach avoids an inappropriate assumption about cognitive activity: namely, that whenever we fail in performing one cognitive activity, there is a distinct cognitive activity at which we succeed. The indeterminacy-allowing approach also meshes well with (...) an attractive view of folk-psychology: that ascriptions can help shape the attitudes they report. (shrink)

When a wrongdoing occurs, victims, barring special circumstance, can aptly forgive their wrongdoers, receive apologies, and be paid reparations. It is also uncontroversial, in the usual circumstances, that wronged parties can aptly blame their wrongdoer. But controversy arises when we consider blame from third-parties after the victim has forgiven. At times it seems that wronged parties can make blame inapt through forgiveness. If third parties blame anyway, it often appears the victim is justified in protesting. “But I forgave him!” In (...) other cases, however, forgiveness seems irrelevant: B can forgive A, but it can still seem that third parties can aptly blame A for the wrong against B. This perplexity adds a dimension to ongoing discussion regarding criteria for apt blame and the related issues of standing and fittingness. This paper explores the status of third party blame after forgiveness. I argue that while post forgiveness blame is often inapt, in many other cases forgiveness is irrelevant. This difference is explained by appeal to the various relationships third parties might have to wronged parties, and how these differences affect the ways we blame and thereby blame’s aptness. (shrink)

Celebrando os quarenta anos de A Hermenêutica do Sujeito — o curso ministrado por Michel Foucault no Collège de France, em 1982 —, este texto propõe-se a estabelecer conexões, gerais e específicas, entre aquele curso e a Educação. É feita uma discussão acerca da perspectiva analítica não metafísica adotada por Foucault, em contraste com o atual discurso pedagógico interpretativo dominante. São discutidos os sentidos que se pode dar a alguns insights daquele curso, em suas relações com a Educação contemporânea. Propondo-se (...) uma diferenciação entre pedagogia e Pedagogia, destaca-se a função subjetivante das práticas pedagógicas na educação escolarizada. Argumenta-se em favor da ontologia histórica, em oposição à ontologia transcendental e recorre-se ao conceito de frame, de modo a ressaltar sua importância e limitações em estudos como este. Discute-se a inversão moderna que colocou ênfase no preceito do “conhece-te a ti mesmo” (gnôthi seautón), deixando em segundo plano o preceito do “cuida de ti mesmo” (epiméleia heautoû), do que resultou a substituição do ideal antigo do sujeito das ações corretas pelo ideal moderno do sujeito dos saberes verdadeiros. Sugere-se que a Educação possa contribuir para suspender a anunciada morte do sujeito ou, pelo menos, mitigar os seus efeitos. Palavras-chave: Foucault; Subjetivação; Pedagogia; Ontologia histórica. Weaves: between Hermeneutics of the Subject and Education Abstract: Celebrating the forty years of The Hermeneutics of the Subject —the course by Michel Foucault at the Collège de France, in 1982—, this text proposes to establish connections, both general and specific, between that course and Education. A discussion is made about the non-metaphysical analytical perspective adopted by Foucault, in contrast to current dominant interpretive pedagogical discourses. The meanings that can be given to some insights from that course are discussed, in their relations with education. Proposing a differentiation between pedagogy and Pedagogy, the subjectivizing function of pedagogical practices in schools is highlighted. We argue in favor of historical ontology, as opposed to transcendental ontology, and we resort to the concept of frame, in order to emphasize its importance and limitations in foucauldian studies. We discuss the modern inversion that placed emphasis on the precept “know thyself” (gnôthi seautón), leaving in the background the precept “take care of yourself” (epiméleia heautoû), which resulted in the replacement of the ideal of the subject of correct actions by the modern ideal of the subject of true knowledge. We suggest that Education can contribute to suspend the announced death of the subject or, at least, mitigate its effects. Keywords: Foucault; Subjectivizing; Pedagogy; Historical ontology. Tesituras: entre la Hermenéutica del Sujeto y la Educación Resumen: Celebrando los cuarenta años de La Hermenéutica del Sujeto —curso por Michel Foucault en el Collège de France, en 1982—, este texto se propone establecer conexiones generales y específicas, entre ese curso y la Educación. Se discute la perspectiva no-metafísica adoptada por Foucault, en contraste con el actual discurso pedagógico interpretativo dominante. Se problematizan los sentidos que se pueden dar a algunos insigths de aquel curso, en sus relaciones con la educación contemporánea. Se propone una diferenciación entre pedagogía y Pedagogía y se destaca la función de subjetivación de las prácticas pedagógicas en las escuelas. Se argumenta a favor de la ontología histórica, en oposición a la ontología transcendental, y se recurre al concepto de frame, para enfatizar su importancia y limitaciones en estudios foucaultianos. Se discute la idea moderna que puso énfasis en el precepto de “conócete a ti mismo” (gnôthi seautón), dejando en segundo plano el “cuida de ti mismo” (epiméleia heautoû), lo que derivó en la sustitución del ideal antiguo del sujeto de las acciones correctas, por el ideal moderno del sujeto del conocimiento verdadero. Se sugiere que la Educación puede contribuir a suspender la anunciada muerte del sujeto o, al menos, mitigar sus efectos. Palabras clave: Foucault; Subjetivación; Pedagogia; Ontologia histórica. Data de registro: 08/07/2022 Data de aceite: 13/12/2022. (shrink)

Jeffrey Bishop’s The Anticipatory Corpse exposes a functional metaphysics at the root of contemporary medical practice that gives rise to inhumane medicine, especially at the end of life. His critique of medicine argues for alternative spaces and practices in which the communal significance of the body, its telos, can be restored and the meaning of a “good death” enriched. This essay develops an alternative epistemology of the body, drawing from Christian theological accounts of the communal or Eucharistic body and linking (...) liturgical practices to the cultivation of solidarity. It argues for an epistemology of the body that makes visible the invisible bodies at medicine’s margins and illumines the disparate worlds of health care globally. (shrink)

From a feminist perspective, unlimited procreative liberty risks treating children as property, distorts understanding of the family, and neglects moral concerns about how we reproduce.

Phillip Cary argues that Augustine invented or created the concept of self as an inner space--as space into which one can enter and in which one can find God. This concept of inwardness, says Cary, has worked its way deeply into the intellectual heritage of the West and many Western individuals have experienced themselves as inner selves. After surveying the idea of inwardness in Augustine's predecessors, Cary offers a re-examination of Augustine's own writings, making the controversial point that in his (...) early writings Augustine appears to hold that the human soul is quite literally divine. Cary goes on to contend that the crucial Book 7 of the Confessions is not a historical report of Augustine's "conversion" experience, but rather an explanation of his intellectual development over time. (shrink)

It follows from Humean principles of plenitude, I argue, that island universes are possible: physical reality might have 'absolutely isolated' parts. This makes trouble for Lewis's modal realism; but the realist has a way out. First, accept absolute actuality, which is defensible, I argue, on independent grounds. Second, revise the standard analysis of modality: modal operators are 'plural', not 'individual', quantifiers over possible worlds. This solves the problem of island universes and confers three additional benefits: an 'unqualified' principle of compossibility (...) can be accepted; the possibility of nothing can be accommodated; and the identity of indiscernible worlds can be decisively refuted. (shrink)

This volume contains eighteen papers, three with new postscripts, that were written over the past 35 years. Five of the papers have not been previously published. Together they provide a comprehensive account of modal reality—the realm of possible worlds—from a Humean perspective, with excursions into neighboring topics in metaphysics. Part 1 sketches an account of reality as a whole, both the mathematical and the modal, defending a form of plenitudinous realism: every consistent proposition is true of some portion of reality. (...) Part 2 presents and defends a realist theory of concrete possible worlds with an absolute ontological distinction between the actual and the merely possible. Part 3 presents and defends a Humean account of modal plenitude, formulating and endorsing principles of recombination, of plenitude of possible structures, and of plenitude of alien contents. Part 4 applies the Humean account to truthmaking, mereology, spacetime, and quantities. I argue that holding fast to Humean strictures leads to views that differ in radical ways from those put forth by contemporary metaphysicians. (shrink)

In this chapter, I survey what I call Lewisian approaches to modality: approaches that analyze modality in terms of concrete possible worlds and their parts. I take the following four theses to be characteristic of Lewisian approaches to modality. (1) There is no primitive modality. (2) There exists a plurality of concrete possible worlds. (3) Actuality is an indexical concept. (4) Modality de re is to be analyzed in terms of counterparts, not transworld identity. After an introductory section in which (...) I motivate analyzing modality in terms of possible worlds, I devote one section to each of these four theses. For each thesis, I take Lewis’s interpretation and defense as my starting point. I then consider and endorse alternative ways of accepting the thesis, some of which disagree substantially with Lewis’s interpretation or defense. There is more than one way to be a Lewisian about modality. (shrink)

Business ethics is a topic receiving much attention in the literature. However, the term 'business ethics' is not adequately defined. Typical definitions refer to the rightness or wrongness of behavior, but not everyone agrees on what is morally right or wrong, good or bad, ethical or unethical. To complicate the problem, nearly all available definitions exist at highly abstract levels. This article focuses on contemporary definitions of business ethics by business writers and professionals and on possible areas of agreement among (...) the available definitions. Then a definition is synthesized that is broad enough to cover the field of management in a sense as full as most managers might conceive of it. (shrink)

I am a realist of a metaphysical stripe. I believe in an immense realm of "modal" and "abstract" entities, of entities that are neither part of, nor stand in any causal relation to, the actual, concrete world. For starters: I believe in possible worlds and individuals; in propositions, properties, and relations (both abundantly and sparsely conceived); in mathematical objects and structures; and in sets (or classes) of whatever I believe in. Call these sorts of entity, and the reality they comprise, (...) metaphysical. In contrast, call the actual, concrete entities, and the reality they comprise, physical. Physical and metaphysical reality together comprise all that there is. In this paper, it is not my aim to defend realism about any particular metaphysical sort of entity. Rather, I ask quite generally whether and how any brand of realism about metaphysical sorts of entity could be justified? (shrink)

Literature in the epistemology of disagreement has focused on peer disagreement: disagreement between those with shared evidence and equal cognitive abilities. Additional literature focuses on the perspective of amateurs who disagree with experts. However, the appropriate epistemic reaction from superiors who disagree with inferiors remains underexplored. Prima facie, this may seem an uninteresting set of affairs. If A is B’s superior, and A has good reason to believe she is B’s superior, A appears free to dismiss B’s disagreement. However, a (...) closer look will show otherwise. I first distinguish competent from incompetent inferiors and then argue that disagreement from the former often gives superiors reason to adjust credence and reevaluate belief. In other words, epistemic inferiority alone is insufficient grounds for dismissing opinion. More nuanced difficulties arise with incompetent inferiors. When superiors disagree with incompetents, this might provide evidence to bolster belief credence; however, agreement from incompetents can defeat justification. In either instance, inferior opinion carries epistemic weight. Yet, this fails to cover all ground; at times, superiors learn nothing from inferior disagreement. I finish by exploring these uninformative disagreements, how to distinguish them from the informative cases, and the proper epistemic reactions thereof. (shrink)